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Abstract 
The VIA Inventory of Strengths and the VIA model were originally developed to assess 
and study 24 character strengths. In this paper, I discuss how the VIA Inventory and its character 
strength model can be applied to the field of moral education with moral philosophical 
considerations. First, I review previous factor analysis studies that have consistently reported 
factors containing candidates for moral virtues, and discuss the systematic structure and 
organization of VIA character strengths. Second, I discuss several issues related to the VIA 
model, including a lack of previous studies that directly support the moral justifiability of the 
model and the presence of a fundamental virtue component required for optimal moral 
functioning in virtue ethics, phronesis, practical wisdom, in the model. Finally, I propose future 
directions for research on the VIA model in order to address the aforementioned issues and 
facilitate the application of the model in moral education. 
Keywords: VIA model, character strengths, moral education, phronesis, factor analysis, 
flourishing, virtue, Aristotelian moral philosophy 
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The VIA Inventory of Strengths, Positive Youth Development, and Moral Education 
Helping students flourishing has been one of the most important goals in the fields of 
human development and education (Han, 2015a; Seligman, 2011). As an effort to achieve the 
aforementioned goal, researchers, practitioners, and educators are attempting to apply findings 
from psychological research, particularly that in the field of positive psychology, to educational 
programs and activities (Kristjánsson, 2012; Seligman, Gillham, Linkins, Reivich, & Ernst, 
2009; White & Waters, 2015). Some of them are interested in the application of positive 
psychology to moral education, particularly those who focus on the development of moral 
character strengths and positive youth development through moral education (Han, 2015a; 
Kristjánsson, 2013).  
Traditionally, moral education aims to develop students’ abilities to make better moral 
judgment through various educational activities, such as dilemma discussions (Kohlberg, 1981, 
1984). Recent research on moral education emphasizes that the development of more diverse 
aspects of human morality, such as moral affect, empathy, motivation, and overall character 
traits promoting moral behavior in addition to the development of moral reasoning, which has 
been underscored in traditional moral education, is required for optimal moral functioning 
(Bebeau, 2002a; Han, 2014b; Sanderse, 2012). Furthermore, moral educators started to focus on 
how to promote positive youth development and flourishing, which has also been underscored by 
positive psychologists, by employing ideas and tools in positive psychology to moral education 
(Han, 2015a, 2015b; Kristjánsson, 2013).  
Thus, in this paper, I will consider how to apply concepts and tools developed in positive 
psychology to moral education. This is timely as promoting positive youth development and 
flourishing among students have become central topics in moral education. First, I will review 
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the VIA Inventory of Strengths and the VIA model (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), which have 
been developed by positive psychologists to operationalize and measure character strengths 
among individuals in a systematic way (Niemiec, 2013). The term, VIA originally stood for 
“Values in Action”. Because the VIA model is one of the most widely used tools to study 
character strengths that potentially constitute the basis of moral character (Niemiec, 2013), I 
intend to focus on this model as a framework to connect positive psychology and moral 
education in this paper. With the examination of the model, I will discuss how to properly apply 
findings from positive psychology, particularly those based on the VIA model, to moral 
education. Second, I will examine whether and how the VIA model can inform moral education 
by reviewing previous studies using the VIA model and inventory. I will focus on whether the 
model and character strengths included in the model can potentially contribute to moral 
education while considering moral philosophical accounts. Third, I will discuss the potential 
limitations in the application of the VIA model to moral education and directions for future 
research to address the limitations. 
The VIA Character Strengths Model 
The VIA character strengths model, developed more than a decade ago (Peterson & 
Seligman, 2004), can be a useful tool to systematically understand the nature and organization of 
character strengths, which constitute the basis of moral character (Althof & Berkowitz, 2006; 
Han, 2015a). The VIA model and the VIA inventory were developed to evaluate one’s strengths 
and weaknesses in her characteristic traits and how such strengths and weaknesses influence her 
well-being, using empirical evidence (C Peterson & Seligman, 2004). The model defines a 
character strength as a behavioral and motivational disposition leading to excellence and 
flourishing, similar to the case of virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 2012), which is pluralistic in nature 
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(Park, Peterson, & Seligman, 2004). Based on this definition, VIA model researchers reviewed 
literature about character strengths in diverse socio-cultural backgrounds and created the VIA 
inventory to measure people’s strengths and weaknesses in twenty-four characteristic traits, 
which were extracted from the literature review (Park et al., 2004). These twenty-four traits are: 
appreciation of beauty and excellence, bravery, citizenship, creativity, curiosity, fairness, 
forgiveness and mercy, gratitude, hope, humor, integrity, judgment, kindness, leadership, love, 
love of learning, modesty and humility, persistence, perspective, prudence, self-regulation, social 
intelligence, spirituality, and zest (Park et al., 2004; C Peterson & Seligman, 2004). 
The model and inventory have been widely utilized to examine character strengths and 
how they contribute to well-being. Consequently, the VIA institute has acquired data from more 
than one million participants who have completed the VIA inventory so far. The institute 
confirmed the reliability and validity of the inventory with the collected dataset (McGrath, 
2015). Moreover, various previous studies have consistently demonstrated that the character 
strengths measured by the VIA inventory significantly contribute to well-being (Martínez-Martí 
& Ruch, 2014; Niemiec, 2013; Park et al., 2004; Proyer, Gander, Wyss, & Ruch, 2011). Several 
previous studies have employed the VIA inventory to measure the influences of interventions on 
the development of character strengths (Baer, 2015; Quinlan, Swain, & Vella-Brodrick, 2012). 
Furthermore, interestingly, the inventors of the VIA model explicitly stated that they developed 
the model and extracted character strengths based on various moral philosophical foundations 
(Park et al., 2004). These points might suggest that the VIA model can help moral educators, 
who are interested in how to promote the development of moral character among students, better 
understand and assess character strengths in a systematic way. 
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Applicability of the VIA Model in Moral Education 
Moral educators need to carefully examine the nature and functioning of character 
strengths to improve moral education. In moral education, which emphasizes the importance of 
moral character, character strengths are deemed to constitute the basis for moral functioning 
(Crossan, Mazutis, & Seijts, 2013; Elias, Parker, Kash, Weissberg, & O’Brien, 2008). Moral 
psychologists have argued that strong character strengths are necessary to initiate and maintain 
moral behavior under challenging circumstances (Bebeau, 2002a). For instance, even if we can 
make a moral decision about what we ought to do to address a moral dilemma, if we do not 
possess certain character strengths, such as courage, moral behavior could not occur. 
Furthermore, Aristotelian moral philosophers also underscore the importance of character 
strengths in moral behavior. According to their perspective, a person’s character can be 
understood as a list of virtues, excellences, and dispositions in behaviors (Hursthouse, 2012) that 
shape how the person behaves in the world. In addition, good character is a state of appropriate 
harmony among emotion, reasoning, and behavior that eventually contributes to moral 
functioning and flourishing according to them (Aristotle, 2000; Homiak, 2015; Malin, Liauw, & 
Damon, 2017).  
Therefore, the VIA model, which assists systematic research on character strengths, will 
be able to contribute to moral education by providing conceptual frameworks to understand and 
tools to assess character strengths. First, the model can provide moral educators and researchers 
with a framework to understand the structure and organization of character strengths that will 
potentially constitute the basis of moral virtues and promote moral behavior. Second, the VIA 
inventory can become a tool to measure such character strengths for assessment and evaluation.   
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However, several points related to the moral justifiability of the VIA model and character 
strengths should be examined while considering its potential contributions to moral education. 
First, whether character strengths measured by the VIA inventory lead to moral ends can be a 
fundamental question that should be solved. Let us consider why we need to carefully examine 
such an issue. Here is one illustrative example demonstrating how the development of character 
strengths without any moral evaluations, which might result in the pursuit of anti-moral goals, 
can be problematic (Han, 2015, p. 292):  
 
Unfortunately, these attempts to justify positive psychology and to apply it to moral 
education cannot be successful without serious and critical considerations from the perspective 
of moral philosophy. Although positive psychologists can develop a more psychologically 
sophisticated concept of happiness, this concept may not be any more morally justified than the 
previous one. For instance, we may imagine the counterexample of a happy and socio-
emotionally well-adjusted gang member. This gang member is always happy and satisfied with 
what he is doing and understands the meaning of his job: taking good care of and having good 
relationships with his cohorts and doing his best for the sake of the vicious purpose of his group. 
Meanwhile he has his negative affection under control and has strong socio-emotional 
resiliency.: 
 
Although the gang member possesses and pursues the development of several character 
strengths, such as kindness and leadership, these character strengths might lead to anti-moral 
ends, such as successful criminal achievements. The strong character strengths that are possessed 
by the gang member and required for socio-emotional functioning will assist the member to 
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achieve anti-moral goals more successfully. In addition, the gang member is highly likely to 
utilize such character strengths to achieve a morally unacceptable goal.  
Hence, whether the possession and implementations of VIA character strengths result in 
the realization of morally acceptable and justifiable goals can be a fundamental issue that should 
at least be addressed before applying the VIA model in moral education. Morality can be defined 
in a normative way despite the fact that it can be defined in diverse ways. In general, morality 
can be defined as “a code of conduct that applies to all” and that “protects a larger group,” i.e., 
human beings’ welfare, in this way (Bebeau, Rest, & Narvaez, 1999; Gert & Gert, 2016; Han, 
2014b). If we take into account the concept of morality defined in Aristotelian moral philosophy, 
which constitutes the basis of this paper, morality guides us to make the most appropriate 
decision and leads to the flourishing of human beings (Dowie, 2000; Han, 2015b; Kristjánsson, 
2014). Unfortunately, no previous studies to date have directly examined whether the possession 
of VIA character strengths contribute to moral dispositions and moral behavioral outcomes.  
Furthermore, how to appropriately implement character strengths is also a fundamental 
issue in optimal moral functioning. Let us consider a character strength, courage, as an example. 
In Nichomachaen Ethics (Aristotle, 2000), extreme courage, rashness, as well as deficiency of 
courage, cowardice, are treated as vices, not virtues, although courage is a fundamental virtue. 
Thus, we have to figure out the golden mean, courage as a moral virtue. The golden mean, 
courage, between those two extreme ends, rashness and cowardice, is not a mere arithmetic 
mean. Instead, a careful evaluation of situational factors is necessary to determine the 
appropriate degree of a character strength, the golden mean, that shall be implemented. In fact, 
previous research using the VIA model warned that possessing extremely strong character 
strengths in certain domains might produce negative behavioral and mental outcomes. Freidlin, 
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Littman-Ovadia, and Niemiec (2017) reported that both the overuse and underuse of character 
strengths were associated with mental issues, such as depression and social anxiety; instead, 
exercising the optimal degree of character strengths significantly predicted satisfaction and 
flourishing. In addition, possible conflicts between individual character strengths should also be 
considered. For example, when we see that our family member is behaving illegally, we may 
experience a conflict between the strength of love (to a family member) and the strength of 
fairness; fairness may ask us to report the police while love may ask us not to do so. Therefore, 
we need to consider how to determine which character strength should be prioritized to 
appropriately address a specific situation for optimal moral functioning. 
Thus, we also need to examine whether the VIA model can address the aforementioned 
issue pertaining to the appropriate implementation of character strengths. In Aristotelian moral 
philosophy, such an issue about finding the golden mean and making the most appropriate 
decision is addressed by phronesis. Phronesis refers to practical wisdom in Aristotelian moral 
philosophy. It enables us to avoid to choose any extreme ends (e.g., cowardice vs. recklessness), 
to know the golden mean (e.g., courage), to find the most appropriate solution, and to behave 
appropriately and morally (Han, 2015a; Kristjánsson, 2013, 2014). From Aristotelian 
perspective, individual character strengths, such as courage and friendliness, can be understood 
as first-order virtues. Unlike the individual first-order virtues, phronesis is regarded as a 
fundamental second-order virtue. A second-order virtue serves as a moderator and plays a 
corrective role in finding the golden mean in various situations while avoiding extreme ends, 
either the overuse or underuse of first-order virtues, and addressing conflicts between different 
first-order virtues (Curzer, 1995; Han, 2015a; Kristjánsson, 2010). 
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Hence, whether the VIA model includes character strength components that work as 
second-order virtues is a central issue in determining its applicability in moral education. At 
least, the VIA model needs to include character strengths that can be considered as candidates for 
second-order virtues, phronesis in particular, that help us find the golden mean to appropriately 
solve a problematic situation while preventing either the underuse or overuse of character 
strengths and addressing conflicts between them. If such a requirement could not be fulfilled, 
moral educators will not be able to study and assess second-order virtues that play fundamental 
roles in optimal moral functioning and producing morally appropriate dispositions and 
behavioral outcomes with the VIA model. Unfortunately, no studies to date have directly 
examined such a point. 
Reviewing Previous Factor Analyses 
To examine whether the VIA model contains character strengths contributing to moral 
functioning, and thus can contribute to the studies of moral education, I reviewed previous factor 
analyses. If the VIA model has morality-related features, character strengths potentially 
associated with such features are supposed to be consistently clustered into factor(s) across 
studies. In addition, such reported factor(s) should contain candidates for first- and second-order 
virtues. More specifically, first, character strengths associated first-order virtues, such as those 
suggested by virtue moral philosophers (e.g. bravery, kindness, gratitude) (Carr, 2014; 
Kristjánsson, 2015), should be consistently extracted as factor(s). Second, in addition to factor(s) 
consisting of first-order moral virtues, factor(s) associated with second-order virtues, particularly 
phronesis, should also be extracted as factor(s). As I discussed in the introduction, the mere 
possession of first-order virtues without phronesis could not lead to optimal moral functioning 
and flourishing according to Aristotelian virtue ethics, because phronesis is required to produce 
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the most appropriate decision and behavioral outcome within a specific context when different 
first-order virtues and values are conflicting with each other (Han, 2015a; Kristjánsson, 2014). If 
we can repeatedly find these factors containing character strengths related to both first- and 
second-order from previous factor analyses of the VIA model, we will be able to say that the 
VIA model possesses the systematic nature of moral virtues, and its applicability to moral 
education is supported from the perspective of virtue ethics.  
Based on the aforementioned points, I focused on two points while reviewing previous 
factor analyses. First, I examined whether factors that contain morality-related character 
strengths, character strengths seemingly associated with individual first-order virtues, were 
extracted as factors in the previous analyses. Second, I reviewed whether the model includes the 
factors of character strengths that are deemed to play corrective and moderating roles, i.e., 
candidates for second-order virtues, such as phronesis, that adjust the strength of the exercise of 
each first-order virtue and help us make the most appropriate moral decisions. 
Searching for Factor(s) with First-order Virtues 
<Place Table 1 about here> 
First, I searched for factor(s) containing character strengths deemed to be associated with 
first-order moral virtues, i.e., individual virtues in particular domains (e.g., courage and 
friendliness), from the VIA character strengths. I first reviewed McGrath's (2014) factor analysis 
with a large dataset (N = 458,998). This large dataset was collected from “458,998 adults who 
completed the VIA-IS instrument online between 2005 and 2008 at the Authentic Happiness 
website, or between 2008 and 2001 at the VIA Institute on Character website (McGrath, 2014, p. 
7).” Because the institute suggests researchers who intend to use the VIA inventory use the 
survey form on its webpage (VIA Institute on Character, 2018a), the large dataset is the largest 
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and most comprehensive dataset collected from diverse populations. As I referred to the moral 
philosophical accounts that defined morality as a code of conduct protects and pursues all human 
beings’ welfare and flourishing in the introduction (Bebeau et al., 1999; Dowie, 2000; Gert & 
Gert, 2016; Han, 2014a, 2015b; Kristjánsson, 2014), I attempted to find other-oriented character 
strength factors—i.e., interpersonal and theological strength factors in McGrath (2014). The 
interpersonal strength factor consisted of fairness, kindness, teamwork, leadership, and 
forgiveness, and the theological strengths factor consisted of zest, hope, gratitude, spirituality, 
and love (McGrath, 2014) (see Table 1).  
Then, I examined in which factor each identified candidate character strength was 
included in other previous factor analyses (Brdar & Kashdan, 2010; Littman-Ovadia & Lavy, 
2012; Macdonald, Bore, & Munro, 2008; McGrath & Walker, 2016; Christopher Peterson, Park, 
Pole, D’Andrea, & Seligman, 2008; Ruch et al., 2010; Shryack, Steger, Krueger, & Kallie, 2010; 
Singh & Choubisa, 2010). I found eight previous factor analysis studies from the list of reviewed 
articles in McGrath (2014) and the VIA Institute on Character webpage containing a list of 
published articles (VIA Institute on Character, 2018b). Among the aforementioned character 
strengths, kindness, teamwork, leadership, and gratitude were consistently categorized as other-
oriented strengths across the eight previous factor analyses (see Table 1). 
Searching for Factor(s) with Second-order Virtues 
Second, I attempted to find which character strengths can be considered as candidates for 
second-order virtues, particularly phronesis, from the previous factor analyses. Similar to the 
prior examination of candidates for first-order virtues, I sought candidates from McGrath’s 
(2014) large-scale analysis. I particularly focused on the character strengths of restraint in his 
analysis, because phronesis in virtue ethics plays a corrective role in the exercise of first-order 
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virtues (Han, 2015a; Kristjánsson, 2014), and it ultimately deal with the morally appropriate 
control of self with practical wisdom (Coope, 2012; Tabachnick, 2004). Consequently, prudence, 
perseverance, self-regulation, judgment, and honesty, which were clustered into the restraint 
factor, were found from his factor analysis. Among these strengths, prudence, self-regulation, 
judgment, and honesty were consistently classified as strengths associated with controlling the 
self through practical reasoning in the aforementioned eight other previous factor analyses (see 
Table 1).  
Consequently, I found that previous factor analysis studies have consistently reported the 
presence of factors associated with candidates for first- and second-order virtues. More 
specifically, interpersonal and theological factors are deemed to be associated with first-order 
virtues, and the restraint factor is deemed to be associated with second-order virtues in 
McGrath’s (2014) large-scale factor analysis. In addition, I was able to identify that factors that 
are potentially associated with first- and second-order virtues were also extracted in other 
previous factor analysis studies as well. Hence, the VIA model and inventory might be able to 
properly explain the nature of moral virtues, and assess character strengths associated with moral 
virtues proposed in virtue ethics, which underscores both first- and second-level virtues in moral 
functioning, in a systematic manner. Findings from the previous factor analysis studies can 
support the potential applicability of the VIA model to the research on and practice of moral 
education. 
Some Remaining Issues 
Although the VIA model was deemed to entail potential candidates for first-order and 
second-order virtues, we should also carefully consider potential limitations of this model. Let us 
consider whether individual VIA character strengths are justifiable from the perspective of 
Running head: THE VIA MODEL AND MORAL EDUCATION  14 
Aristotelian moral philosophy. While my review of the previous factor analyses showed that 
several character strengths can be candidates for first-order and second-order virtues, it is still 
unclear whether such character strengths can eventually lead to moral ends.  
First, whether possessing strong character strengths that are potentially associated with 
first-order virtues helps the generation of moral dispositions and moral behavioral outcomes is 
still unclear due to lack of previous research directly addressing this question. For instance, let us 
consider this brief hypothetical situation. A person received a high score for the character 
strength of “bravery” on the VIA inventory. Of course, courage, one of fundamental first-order 
moral virtues, is required to initiate and sustain moral behavior (Bebeau, 2002b). However, the 
mere possession of this character strength per se, which is measured by the VIA inventory, might 
not necessary motivate us to engage in moral behavior. Bravery might enable a villain to achieve 
its anti-moral purpose, instead. Although my review demonstrated that previous factor analyses 
consistently reported character strength factors that can be understood as candidates for various 
important first-order moral virtues, whether they necessarily lead to moral dispositions and moral 
behavioral outcomes is still unclear. 
Second, whether character strengths that are deemed to be candidates for second-order 
virtues, such as prudence, self-regulation, judgment, and honesty, actually work as second-order 
virtues in the reality as a way explained in virtue ethics is also still unclear. Although my review 
of previous factor analyses suggest that some character strengths consistently clustered into a 
factor are possibly associated with second-order virtues, the character strengths might not play 
corrective and moderating roles for the optimal functioning of first-order virtues. For example, 
there have been no previous research about whether strong prudence, self-regulation, judgment, 
and honesty prevent either underuse or overuse of other character strengths (Freidlin et al., 
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2017), and are associated with developed moral functioning, such as sophisticated reasoning and 
judgment in the domain of morality (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999; Walker, 1980). 
Furthermore, although the aforementioned VIA character strengths potentially associated with 
decision-making skills may be candidates for phronesis, the mere exercise of such strengths does 
not necessarily lead to morally appropriate results. Let us consider the illustrative example of the 
well-regulated gang member once again (Han, 2015a). Although the gang member might possess 
strong character strengths considered as candidates for second-order virtues, the exercise of the 
character strengths is likely to result in well-regulated but vicious behavioral outcomes, not 
morally appropriate outcomes. In fact, May (2017) argued that sophisticated and developed 
reasoning abilities may serve in anti-moral ways, such as moral rationalization to justify one’s 
anti-moral behavior. Likewise, vicious deeds done by the aforementioned gang member are 
likely to be much more negative and successful compared with those done by a gang member 
who does not possess the aforementioned character strengths. Due to these issues, it is still 
unclear whether the VIA model contains any character strength(es) that properly function as 
phronesis.  
Future Directions 
How will we be able to address the aforementioned issues in future research? First, let us 
consider ideas for future studies for the moral justification of the VIA character strength. We can 
examine relationships between VIA character strengths and moral developmental indicators, for 
example, the Defining Issues Test (DIT) score (Rest et al., 1999) measuring the development of 
moral reasoning, or the Moral Competence Test (MCT) score (Lind, 2008) testing whether one 
can make consistent moral decisions across different situations, in order to examine whether the 
character strengths are associated with moral development. We can consider employing more 
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recently developed tools assessing Aristotelian virtues and the development of moral character 
(Arthur et al., 2014; Curren & Kotzee, 2014; Morgan, Gulliford, & Kristjánsson, 2014). Moral 
development in this context implies moral development from the perspective Aristotelian moral 
philosophy and character development (Han, 2015b). There are two phases of moral 
development from the Aristotelian perspective: internalization and habituation of virtues and 
cultivation of phronesis through deliberation (Sanderse, 2014). For example, improvement of 
character strengths considered as candidates for first-order virtues is possibly associated with the 
first phase of Aristotelian moral development, the internalization and habituation of virtues. 
Moreover, sophistication of character strengths considered as candidates for second-order virtues 
can be related to the second phase, the cultivation of phronesis. Thus, the suggested future 
studies will inform us whether pursuing the development of VIA character strengths, which are 
deem to be associated with moral character strengths and virtues, in moral education can 
eventually contribute to moral development and lead to moral ends.  
Second, we need studies examining whether second-order virtues moderate the 
performance of first-order virtues. I would propose that character strengths that seem to be 
candidates for second-order virtues—for example, self-regulation, judgment, and honesty—
should moderate character strengths candidates for first-order virtues—for example, bravery and 
kindness. Because second-order virtues, phronesis in particular, play a corrective role, the 
moderation of the exercise of individual first-order virtues to produce the most appropriate 
disposition and behavioral outcome in a given situation, according to virtue ethics, candidate 
character strengths of second-order virtues in the VIA model are also expected to demonstrate 
the similar moderating effect. If we find that the candidate character strengths of second-order 
virtues positively moderate the relationship between candidate character strength of first-order 
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virtues and positive behavioral and developmental outcomes, for example, service engagement 
(Han, Kim, Jeong, & Cohen, 2017; Malin, Ballard, & Damon, 2015; Malin, Han, & Liauw, 
2017) and meaning in life (Han, Liauw, & Kuntz, 2018; Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006), 
we can have evidence supporting that such character strengths may actually function as second-
order virtues.  
Once future research successfully addresses the remaining issues, moral educators and 
researchers in the field of moral education will be able to utilize the VIA model and inventory to 
systematically assess character strengths that constitute the basis of optimal moral functioning 
and flourishing among students. If we discover that character strengths in the VIA model are 
strongly associated with moral developmental indicators and moral virtues including both first- 
and second-order virtues, researchers and educators in the field of moral education will have a 
tool for research and evaluation of educational programs that is empirically supported (White & 
Waters, 2015). If stronger VIA characters strengths are found to be associated with more 
developed moral reasoning and practical wisdom, and finally, flourishing, we will be able to 
assess students’ character strengths constituting the basis of moral functioning in a more 
systematic manner (Shryack et al., 2010). In addition, the VIA model will help researchers and 
moral educators better assess and understand more diverse aspects of moral character strengths 
(Kern, Waters, Adler, & White, 2015), which could not be properly assessed by previous moral 
psychological tools focusing on specific aspects of moral functioning, such as the DIT focusing 
on moral reasoning and the MCT focusing on moral competence (Lind, 2008; Thoma, 2006).  
Conclusion 
In this paper, I briefly discussed the applicability of the VIA model within in moral 
education from the perspective of Aristotelian moral philosophy as the analytic framework. My 
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review of previous factor analyses demonstrated that the VIA model seemingly includes factors 
that contain character strengths that might be considered as candidates for first- and second-order 
virtues. However, future research should attempt to address several issues discussed in this paper 
that arise from the moral philosophical perspective, because the previous factor analyses per se 
do not necessarily confirm that the reported character strength factors function as first- and 
second-order virtues in a way explained in Aristotelian moral philosophy. Once future research 
shows that the VIA model contains character strengths promote optimal moral functioning and 
flourishing in the reality, the model will become a more robust research program that contributes 
to studies not only in positive psychology, but also in moral psychology and moral education.  
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Tables 
Table 1 








Peterson et al. 
(2008) 
Macdonald et al. 
(2008) 
Ruch et al. 
(2010) 
Singh and 
Choubisa (2010) Shryack et al. (2010) 
Littman-Ovadia 
and Lavy (2012) 
Strengths deemed to be related with first-order moral virtues 
Fairness Interpersonal Self-control Interpersonal Temperance Niceness Interpersonal Civic Sociability Emotional 
Kindness Interpersonal Other-oriented Interpersonal Interpersonal Niceness Interpersonal Interpersonal Sociability Emotional 
Teamwork Interpersonal Vitality Interpersonal Interpersonal Positivity Interpersonal Civic Sociability Emotional 
Leadership Interpersonal Vitality Interpersonal Interpersonal Positivity Interpersonal Civic Sociability Emotional 
Forgiveness Interpersonal Other-oriented Interpersonal Temperance Niceness Interpersonal Theological Sociability Emotional 
Zest Theological Vitality Vitality Transcendence Positivity Emotional Self-assurance Agency/self-assuredness Intellectual 
Hope Theological Vitality Vitality Transcendence Positivity Emotional Self-assurance Agency/self-assuredness Theological 
Gratitude Theological Vitality Interpersonal Transcendence Niceness Theological Theological Sociability Theological 
Spirituality Theological Vitality Cautiousness Transcendence Niceness Theological Self-assurance  Theological 
Love Theological Vitality Interpersonal Interpersonal Positivity Emotional Theological Sociability Emotional 
Strengths deemed to be related with second-order moral virtues 
Prudence Restraint Self-control Fortitude Temperance Conscientiousness Restraint Civic Conscientiousness Restraint 
Perseverance Restraint Vitality Cautiousness Fortitude Conscientiousness Restraint Self-assurance Conscientiousness Restraint 
Self-regulation Restraint Self-control Cautiousness Fortitude Conscientiousness Restraint Self-assurance Conscientiousness Restraint 
Judgment Restraint Self-control Fortitude Fortitude Conscientiousness Intellectual Intellectual Agency/Self-assuredness Restraint 
Honesty Restraint Self-control Cautiousness Fortitude Conscientiousness Restraint Civic Conscientiousness Restraint 
N 458,998 23,850 881 1,739 123 1,674 123 332 635 
Note. Character strengths categorized in similar categories were highlighted with the same color.  
 
